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31 January 2011

The Transporter Problem

Most of you are probably familiar with the Transporter Problem.

The use of this low-resolution image for commentary purposes should qualify as fair use. Please don't sue me.

For those who aren't, here's the background: You step into a Star Trek-style teleportation device and are instantly transported from one place to another. This process involves scanning your body at high resolution, deconstructing it, transmitting the data (and potentially the original molecules) to the destination, and finally reconstructing your body according to the schematic.

So the problem is this: the transporter kills you.

Oh, sure, it makes a copy at the other end, and from the perspective of that copy nothing untoward occurred, but from the perspective of the original who is disintegrated, it's curtains. It doesn't matter whether the same molecules are used to reconstruct the copy at the other end: continuity of consciousness is disrupted (and when you get right down to it one carbon atom is as good as any other).

The main character in Cory Doctorow's excellent Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom muses over a similar problem*, so perhaps Bones was right to be wary of the device after all.

Regardless, it is clear that if such a device were possible, it would stand to reason that it should be equally possible to create a perfect copy without destroying the original. I was chatting with some coworkers about this a few weeks ago, and one raised the following question: If an exact copy of you were made, down to the molecule, but before it happened you were given a choice between having your leg sawed off (sans anesthetic) or to have the copy's leg sawed off, which would you choose? Does it make a difference?

I should think not. Taken together, we're down a leg either way, and since we're identical duplicates it doesn't matter whose leg it is. After the event, both the copy and the original will have the memory of choosing who will have the leg sawed off: one will remember choosing itself, and the other will remember choosing the other. I figure that it's best to choose randomly, to avoid any hard feelings.

Although one of my colleagues was in complete agreement, another thought that this was a blatant violation of my self-interest, and that my choice was irrational. But the fact remains that on the other side of "the event", both of them are you: What possible difference could it make?



* This book, incidentally, has one of my all-time favourite opening lines: "I lived long enough to see the cure for death; to see the rise of the Bitchun Society, to learn ten languages; to compose three symphonies; to realize my boyhood dream of taking up residence in Disney World; to see the death of the workplace and of work. I never thought I'd live to see the day when Keep A-Movin' Dan would decide to deadhead until the heat death of the Universe."

The book is available for free, so you have no excuse not to read it!



Addendum: Zach Weiner has apparently already covered this topic with some authority.

5 comments:

  1. Dear sir,

    I would suggest that both of them are not "you". One is the original and one is a copy. There is a difference between the two based on the past; namely that one had existed since around the time of "your" birth, and the other since it was materialized by the machine.

    Put differently:
    "The 2 Laws of Iwasherefirst"™©®

    Take two identical items, one of which you have used since birth.

    Law #1 The two identical items are not the same item.

    Law #2 They differ based on their material history, and physical location.

    Since conscious experience is reliant upon both material and cognitive history, as well as direct physical experience, it is rational to ascribe an emotional/cognitive/intellectual (What have you) value to one item over the other, as it is unique in a relevant way.

    It is only true that identical items are equivalent in the absence of material history, and assuming the physical locations are not relevant.


    Therefore given the material history of the original person being teleported, there should be an additional value ascribed by said person to themselves over the copy.

    ReplyDelete
  2. Hey, Anon. Thanks for your thoughts. I disagree, of course.

    "I would suggest that both of them are not 'you'. One is the original and one is a copy. There is a difference between the two based on the past; namely that one had existed since around the time of 'your' birth, and the other since it was materialized by the machine."

    Okay, sure, but the duplicate is "you" in every meaningful way. I would challenge you to demonstrate that the "timestamp" of the object has any relevance to the discussion. The individual molecules that make up your body are in a constant state of turnover; it's the pattern that they form that is relevant, not the individual molecules themselves.

    (For atomic turnover, see the following secondary sources: http://www.eoht.info/page/Turnover+rate; http://www.bluelight.ru/vb/showpost.php?s=dad8fbe0586d996eba73b25617e220ad&p=7418312&postcount=3. I don't claim them as authoritative, but I'm not in disposed to track down primary sources at the moment.)

    "Law #1 The two identical items are not the same item."

    Right. I didn't claim that they were the same item. I simply said that they were both "you".

    "Law #2 They differ based on their material history, and physical location."

    I don't see how material history is relevant (as explained above) outside of an arbitrary cultural context. The same goes for physical location: if you step across the room, you differ in physical location from your previous self, but I don't think that this fact makes you any less "you". If I'm missing something, please let me know!

    "Since conscious experience is reliant upon both material and cognitive history, as well as direct physical experience..."

    I disagree. I would argue that conscious experience is reliant only upon the material state of the brain that generates that consciousness, and upon the sensory input and feedback stimuli according to which brain state changes occur. Those brain states may in turn be the result of physical experience, cognitive history, etc., but we are positing a machine that could replicate a person down to the molecule, including any attendant brain state. If the material state of the brain is identical, and the sensory inputs are identical, then what's the difference?

    I think that we would both agree that if a child were told that his or her teddy bear had been replaced with an exact duplicate, the child would be quite angry—but I'm not aware of any reason that this should be so. If you knew that it was a different person/object, then I'm sure that you would be upset. But I find this to be irrational.

    "Therefore given the material history of the original person being teleported, there should be an additional value ascribed by said person to themselves over the copy."

    Not only have you failed to demonstrated that the material history of the original person is relevant, you have also not demonstrated that if it were relevant the original should have greater (rather than, say, lesser) value.

    I like new stuff. ;)

    ReplyDelete
  3. Dear Spurll,

    Thank you for your response. I would be happy to return the favour:


    “Right. I didn't claim that they were the same item. I simply said that they were both "you".”

    Indeed, and I did not claim that you claimed that they were the same item. I simply stated that they were not. Would you allow that in this case, the set of two identical people is composed of an original and a copy? Clearly they are not the same object, as they occupy different spaces, and while you may wish to claim that the distinction is irrelevant, I suspect that you wouldn’t claim to show that it doesn't exist.

    “...but the duplicate is "you" in every meaningful way. I would challenge you to demonstrate that the "timestamp" of the object has any relevance to the discussion...it's the pattern that they form that is relevant, not the individual molecules themselves....I don't see how material history is...outside of an arbitrary cultural context.”

    You’ve acknowledged my point, however in an act of objective bias, you have simply chosen to assign it no relevance. In response to your challenge, I will speak to what you lightly refer to as “an arbitrary cultural context”. If you simply wish to argue that both the original and the copy are identical except for location, and that such a state is necessary and sufficient to conclude that both can be treated as the same, than you have proposed and solved a tautological problem consisting of comparing two molecular configurations and finding them to be identical. A=B ∴ A=B

    However, we are speaking of both molecular configurations, which are the identical, as well as the cultural and cognitive framework in which the molecular copying occurs. The provenance of a molecular configuration is important to humans both culturally, psychologically and because provenance provides a taxonomic classification system with which to ascribe unique characteristics to extremely similar, or even identical items. The ability to trace the continuity of a molecular configuration through time and space allows us to ascribe it a unique provenance. It is actually irrational to attempt to sideline the importance of provenance simply because it touches upon cultural and psychological aspects which often prove challenging for those who prefer simpler and more clear-cut solutions.


    Atomic turnover is not pertinent to the discussion, as the argument is not about molecular similarity, which is a trivial fact, though the focus of your comments. Molecular provenance, within the cultural human context is key, and only by ignoring the fact that the proposed situation occurs within the context of human experience is this ignored. It is not rational to ignore the human experience and instead attempt to narrowly focus on physical properties given the framework of the transporter problem.

    (Continued...)

    ReplyDelete
  4. Given that the rational choice is to acknowledge that molecular provenance should be taken into account, the question is than whether there should be additional value ascribed to the original or copy. The answer, of course, is subjective, however we can note the following:

    1) Molecular provenance is distinctly different between the original and the copy.

    2) Self-preservation is a universal quality amongst living organisms, and is generally the primary foundation of most ethical frameworks.

    3) As a universal quality, in the absence of context, self-preservation of life and limb would be the default position of the pre-experiment person, and would ascribe additional value to the original, as its molecular provenance will not match the copy.

    4) Given the context of a hypothetical situation (The person in question is the inventor of the device, and believes there is greater utility in copying himself, than preserving the original) a rational choice may be to ascribe more value to the copy. However, the majority of cases will continue to favour the self-preservation of the original, as once the first copy is made, successive copies will only serve to destroy molecular provenance, without adding anything novel.

    In sum, you have failed to treat the problem as anything more than a simple state comparison, despite the human and cultural context in which it is occurring. You have failed to take into account the molecular provenance of the original and the copy, which shows that they are not both “you. Further, you have failed to show how or why self-preservation should not be taken into account as the default position, given that there exists an original which is the same as the person before the transport, and a copy, which though identical, is not the same as the person before the transport.


    Enjoy! ;)

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  5. Wow, I think you guys need to take a page from reddit's book and provide TLDRs.

    People will usually choose to have their clone get the axe, simply due to the perceived value in continuity. Understanding that we are all subject to this psychological preference, wouldn't it be better to cut off the clone's leg? That way the original can say that he did it because of the human disposition towards continuity, and the clone can say "cool! I just got cloned! I will now devote this gift of life to furthering the field of prosthetics and stem cell research!"

    TLDR:fuck clones. If it were up to me I'd saw both their legs off.

    Greg

    ReplyDelete