On this episode of Life, the Universe & Everything Else, Ashlyn, Laura, Gem, and Lauren talk about how bad we are at assessing risk. Also on this episode: Do we get more risk averse as we get older? Is margarine going to kill you, or will a hippopotamus get you first? Will the world end not with a bang but a Boolean?
Life, the Universe & Everything Else is a program promoting secular humanism and scientific skepticism that is produced by the Winnipeg Skeptics.
Note: Music featured in this episode include samples from "Death from the Skies" by George Hrab (featuring Phil Plait), "Paranoid Android" by Radiohead, and "Binnorie" by Mediæval Bæbes.
In this episode of Life, the Universe & Everything Else, Gem talks about intelligence in nonhuman animals with Ashlyn, Laura, and special guest Leslie Saunders.
Life, the Universe & Everything Else is a program promoting secular humanism and scientific skepticism that is produced by the Winnipeg Skeptics.
In this episode of Life, the Universe & Everything Else, Gem is joined by Donna, Ashlyn, and Ian to talk about free will, determinism, and what it means to make a choice. Also on this episode, Donna sits down with August Berkshire of Minnesota Atheists to discuss the moral implications of a world without free will. We went a little long, but don't blame us: determinism exempts us from all ethical responsibility!
A new theory of brain function by Peter Ulric Tse, a professor of cognitive neuroscience at Dartmouth College, suggests that free will is real and has a biophysical basis in the microscopic workings of our brain cells.
Well, I guess that's that. I guess I was wrong. I'm skeptic enough to admit that.
Tse's findings, which contradict recent claims by neuroscientists and philosophers that free will is an illusion, have theological, ethical, scientific and legal implications for human behavior, such as whether people are accountable for their decisions and actions.
Broad theological implications? You bet! I'm sure his research will be met with sighs of relief from seminary students who are struggling with theodicy.
In contrast with philosophers who use logic rather than data to argue whether mental causation or consciousness can exist...
Oooh-kay. That's enough.
The research sounds interesting, to be honest. It's always nice to nail down neurological specifics, but the way this research is being framed is more than a little disappointing. The article doesn't go into much detail, of course (it basically comes down to "buy the book"*), but none of the findings outlined seem shocking to me, and I doubt that any other determinist would feel differently. In fact, I'm sorely tempted to call out the article for knocking down straw determinists.
This gets around the standard argument against free will that is based on the impossibility of self-causation.
I have literally never heard any determinist argue that "self-causation" is impossible. Assuming everything that Tse says is correct, it does nothing to change my position on free will, because when you get down to brass tacks our positions seem to be basically identical.
My problem with the concept of "free will" as it's expressed in religious contexts is the implication that it is contra-causal. Saying that "free will is real" and that Tse has discovered its "biophysical basis" will just lead to further misunderstandings in the eyes of the public (and will presumably permit Tse to feel smugly superior to philosophers). It seems to me like Tse is trying to puff up his chest a bit and say, "Case closed!" His research seems interesting in that it nails down some specifics of self-causation in a compatibilist (causally-bound "free" will) context, but it does nothing to rescue contra-causal free will (nor do I think it's meant to).
My argument basically boils down to this: When you talk about "free will", most lay people are talking about one thing (contra-causal free will), while most philosophers and neuroscientists are talking about another (compatibilist or causally-bound "free" will). As I've argued on several occasions, I think that the former is absurd and runs contrary to the existing evidence (and this new research has nothing much to add here), while the latter is simply a rebranding of soft determinism in an attempt to rescue the language of free will (and has the unfortunate side-effect of permitting us to continue to pretend that people are morally blameworthy on some fundamental level and to deal with others punitively, rather than with compassion). And that's not okay.
Discussions of free will are rife with equivocation and confusion is to some extent inevitable. I'm happy to have a discussion on the extent to which the language of free will is useful (and in this matter, as in the matter of the Oxford comma, I do not shrink from staking out a clear position) but I wish that others would be more careful in properly defining their terms. Saying what amounts to "Those silly philosophers can't out-logic my hard data!" when you haven't done much to address the points they've actually made is unhelpful at best.
In summary, it seems to me that contra-causal free will remains unsupported by the evidence, that compatibilist or causally-bound conceptions of free will are problematic, and that the Oxford comma generally serves to increase the clarity of complex sentences.
Hat tip to Gary Barbon for the link.
* And no, I haven't read his book, so I cannot fully evaluate every argument that he makes therein. Feel free to sneeringly point this out to your heart's content. That's what the comments section is for, after all.
On Saturday, 29 September 2012, the Winnipeg Skeptics held their third annual SkeptiCamp event. SkeptiCamp Winnipeg is a conference for the sharing of ideas. It is free and open to the public: anyone can attend and participate! Presentations and discussions focus on science and free inquiry, and the audience is encouraged to challenge presenters to defend their ideas.
Mike Innes is a geek gone wrong. He has a tan, he can throw and catch a ball, and he looks you in the eye when he's talking to you (some of the time). He's also a disgruntled IT worker for a local insurance company, armchair philosopher, and self-proclaimed face-melter of Internet trolls.
SkeptiCamp is an open conference celebrating science and critical thinking. For more information please visit SkeptiCamp.org.
SkeptiCamp is an open conference celebrating science and critical thinking. For more information please visit SkeptiCamp.org.
Logical Fallacies (A Spoonful of Sugar)
Paul Nordin is a member of the Winnipeg Skeptics and the Winnipeg Secularists. He is currently majoring in philosophy at the University of Winnipeg.
Free Will: What is it? and Do we have it?
Gem Newman graduated with distinction from the University of Manitoba with a B.Sc. in Computer Science, specialising in Artificial Intelligence. He founded the Winnipeg Skeptics in 2010, and more recently he co-produced a short documentary called "The Nonbelievers' Beliefs" with fellow skeptic Scott Carnegie. He blogs at WinnipegSkeptics.com, StartledDisbelief.com, and occasionally at SkepticsOnThe.Net.
Denialism
Jeff Olsson is a former Anglican priest and the current president of the Humanist Association of Manitoba. His book, Leaving Faith Behind, is available on Amazon from Xlibris. The Humanist Association of Manitoba can be found at mb.humanists.ca.
What follows is a transcript of my presentation from the Winnipeg Skeptics' second annual SkeptiCamp Winnipeg, an open conference celebrating science and critical thinking.
Free Will: What is it?
So what is free will? Well, it depends who you ask.
Free Will: Three Views
I'll briefly sketch outlines of three views of free will in this presentation.
The first is that of "Libertarian Agency". While many off-the-cuff definitions of free will seem to quickly descend into tautology, by far the most cogent definition of free will that I've come across was offered by Apologist J.P. Moreland.
The second position that I'll discuss (the dissenting view) is the determinist position. In brief: we do not have free will.
Finally, I'll take a moment to introduce the compatibilist position, which states that determinism can be reconciled with free will. This is the position taken by many modern naturalist philosophers, such as Daniel C. Dennett.
Libertarianism
[Insert Ron Paul joke here.]
In his essay "Naturalism and Libertarian Agency", Moreland describes his "libertarian" view of free will. He insisted that our actions do not have prior causes: you are the ultimate cause of your own actions. You can initiate and/or stop yourself from initiating any action. We are all "little gods", "unmoved movers".
Now, you may ask why I'm citing an apologist to define free will. Well, theologians tend to spend a lot of time thinking about free will, as it is central to theodicy and many other works of apologetics. I'll be dealing primarily with libertarianism for the purposes of this talk, but I'll briefly discuss a different, compatibilist view of free will later on.
Libertarian agency is also called contra-causal free will, because it holds that our decisions are not bound (or "determined") by a causal chain of events. However, if our minds (and therefore our decision-making processes) are entirely the product of our brains (which are made of matter), it is difficult to imagine how our thoughts could be completely free, or causally unbound. For this reason, free will is often linked with dualism. Within this framework, the "soul" or "spirit" (which is not composed of matter, and is therefore freed from causation) is the "free agent" in decision making.
Free Will: Do we have it?
"Man can do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills."
—Arthur Schopenhauer?
Einstein attributed this to Schopenhauer but, as often happens, it seems that the original source is slightly less pithy.1 Regardless, it certainly captures the sentiment.
Do we have free will? I don't think so. Not the libertarian kind, anyway.
Laplace's Demon
"We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at any moment knew all forces that animate Nature and the mutual positions of the beings that comprise it, if this intellect were vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes."
—Pierre-Simon Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities
Determinism
Determinism holds that we live in a causal universe, and that we are not somehow exempt from that web of causality. Our thoughts and deeds are fully caused. Our decisions are the effects of prior causes, and the causes of future effects.
Put simply, determinism is the position that your choices, like all other aspects of the macroscopic universe, have causal antecedents; that is to say, given the same options and the same set of preconditions, you will always make the same choice.
But we still make choices. If you're at the café for lunch, and you decide to get a regular Pepsi instead of your usual Diet Pepsi, there was a reason for that: probably many reasons, that all came together in that one decision. In fact, the question, "Why did you do that?" really only makes sense within a deterministic framework.
Remember: determinism doesn't say that you're some sort of mindless automaton with no mental life. You still deliberate over choices, your past experiences still play a role, you'll still sometimes make snap judgements based on your emotions instead of thinking things through—but all of these factors are fully caused, and causally affect your decision-making process in turn.
Determinism does constrain you, but it only constrains you to act within your own character—which, upon reflection, doesn't seem so bad.
The Process of Deliberation
Within the deterministic framework, your decision may be influenced by a multitude of factors. Some of these factors may be consciously recognized, while you may be completely unaware of others. Regardless, from the determinist perspective, your decisions are the result of a calculus. A whole bunch of variables go in, and a decision comes out.
Let's contrast this with contra-causal free will: you are waiting to cross the street, and the light says "Don't Walk". Perhaps you're running late for a meeting, perhaps you've been standing in line all day and you're feeling impatient, and perhaps you were recently issued a citation by a police officer for jaywalking. Does any of this factor in to your decision to cross against the light? If you're a "libertarian agent", the answer must be "no" (or at the very least, "not necessarily"). If you are an unmoved mover, you simply choose.
In many ways, a free choice is a meaningless choice.
When you're weighing your options, this is a deterministic process. In fact, "weighing" one's options is an excellent analogy for the way decision-making works within a deterministic framework.
Even though it might seem like a close call, 30 grams of lead and 15 grams of gold will always weigh more than 5 grams of silver and 35 grams of copper. If you weighed them a second time, could things come out differently?
I'll expand a little on the example that I used earlier (which I stole from the guys at Reasonable Doubts, by the way). Let's say you're ordering lunch, and you're trying to choose whether you're going to have a Pepsi or a Diet Pepsi. Your decision may be influenced by how you're feeling about yourself, by whether your spouse has recently made a comment about your waistline, by whether you have a strong dislike for the aftertaste common to diet sodas, by whether you suffer from diabetes or chronic hypoglycaemia, by whether you have a sweet tooth, by whether your father used to drink a Diet Pepsi while he worked on the car, by whether you just saw a magazine with a really slim model on the cover, or by whether you've decided that aspartame (or high-fructose corn syrup, for that matter) is part of a secret government mind-control project.
Do we have options in a deterministic universe? Does it make sense to say that you chose the Diet Pepsi over the Pepsi? Doesn't that imply that things could have worked out differently?
Well, in a sense, things could have worked out differently—had a different set of contingencies been in play. When choices or options are presented to us, we don't necessarily know which we will choose, but that doesn't make our choice free from causal influence.
Imagine that you are standing before a door. You might say, "Maybe there's a person behind that door." Either there is or there isn't; only one of those propositions is true, and which is true has already been determined. Your statement, "Maybe there's a person behind that door," reflects only your ignorance of which of these options has been determined. Similarly, "Maybe I'll have the Diet Pepsi," doesn't have to reflect "real" options; it may simply reflect your own uncertainty about which option you will eventually choose.
The Evidence for Causal Determinism
"Yes, we have a soul. But it's made of lots of tiny robots."
—Giulio Giorello
Although they are not without their critics, the studies of Haynes and Libet have provided evidence that decisions that we think we're making are actually made before we're even aware of them. This suggests that the "choice" that we consciously experience may be more a self-report, an epiphenomenon.
There is also a significant body of evidence from the field of psychology showing that our decisions can be predictably, causally affected by psychological priming and by transcranial magnetic stimulation.
There is also the case of Phineas Gage, a nineteenth century railway foreman who was seriously injured on the job. In an accidental explosion, he had a steel rod blown in through one eye and out through the top of his head. Although he survived, his personality and behaviour were severely affected. According to the attending physician, he became profane and impulsive.2
This handful of examples serves to demonstrate that our decisions are not freed from the web of causation.
And where does does this leave libertarian free will? To again quote Laplace, "Je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse-là."
Common Objections to Determinism
"If determinism is true, our concepts of morality and justice are meaningless! We would have no responsibility for our actions!"
There are two main problems that I have with this objection. First of all, it isn't true. While it may be that we can't assign ultimate blame to people for their actions, even actions that we may find morally repugnant, there are several ethical systems which don't rely on assigning ultimate responsibility to the actors involved (consequentialism, for example, or even virtue ethics).
As far as justice goes, while a punitive system of justice makes no sense within a deterministic framework, a correctional system does. We can also focus on the prevention of crime. A system of justice based upon retribution avails us nothing.
Second, even if it were true that our concepts of morality and justice would fall by the wayside within the deterministic framework, that's not actually an argument against the truth of determinism. This is what it's known as an argument from final consequences, a fairly common logical fallacy.
In fact, many of the other arguments levelled against determinism come in the form of the argument from final consequences: "If determinism is true, then I'm just a robot!" Yup. I guess so. "If people think that their actions are determined, they're more likely to cheat and steal!" Probably true, actually, based upon some recent psychological studies. But again, that's not really an argument.
"But what about the soul?"
I'm more or less assuming monism for the purposes of the talk. I think that the principle of parsimony and fairly solid neurological evidence suggests monism over dualism. Dualism really falls apart when examined in light of modern psychology and neuroscience. It is a fact that core personality attributes can be altered by a physical change to the brain. The soul, if it exists, would seem to be completely redundant.
"Quantum indeterminacy. That is all."
It is true that quantum indeterminacy may pose a problem for a strict interpretation of determinism.3 The quantum uncertainty gambit is a red herring, however, in that it actually does nothing to rescue free will.
Modern physics tells us that there are genuinely indeterminate events that occur on a quantum level, so there may be a sense in which (on a very small scale) events are not strictly deterministic. But there are two primary reasons to think that this has no bearing on the issue of free will. First of all, that quantum indeterminacy seems to cancel out at the macroscopic level. Neurons and synapses, while small, are not at all likely to be impacted by this uncertainty. Second, even if there is some way in which quantum indeterminacy may have some impact on the functioning of the brain, how would a random, indeterminate event open the door for free will? As Jeremy Beahan, Adjunct Instructor of Philosophy at Kendall College, put it:
An indeterminate event is even more frightening than a determinate event, because even in determinate events you can say, "Hey, look, my past experiences, the influence of my environment, everything like that goes into this choice." A genuinely indeterminate event, if that could affect consciousness, then that's something that just happened. And something that happens randomly is not the same thing as freedom.
"Determinism is unfalsifiable."
Of all of these criticisms, this is the one that I find most coherent. However, I still disagree. Lab studies can and do show predictable, and replicable causal influence on our decision making. Now, you may well object that influenced does not mean determined. I have two responses to that: First, I would contend that given the obvious difficulties in controlling for all variables when conducting these tests, we shouldn't expect to get a 100% determined outcome. The physics of the brain is immensely complex. Second, if our decisions can be even influenced by factors outside of our understanding or control, how can they be called in any meaningful sense "free"?
Saying that we may be influenced, but there's still perhaps a tiny place for a free agent to make free decisions really boils down to a free-will-of-the-gaps argument.
I have also encountered other objections, but time constraints do not allow me to discuss them at length.4
Compatibilism
There are some definitions of free will that are compatible with determinism.
Rather than asserting that a decision could have come out differently even had all of the contingencies been the same (the libertarian position), compatibilists may define "free will" simply as an agent's capacity to act in a manner that is not coerced or restrained.
Daniel Dennett articulates his two-stage model of decision making in his essay, "On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want":
[W]hen we are faced with an important decision, a consideration-generator whose output is to some degree undetermined produces a series of considerations, some of which may of course be immediately rejected as irrelevant by the agent... Those considerations ... then figure in a reasoning process, and … ultimately serve as predictors and explicators of the agent's final decision.
That's not only compatible with determinism, that is determinism!
Free Will: Do we have it?
Again, it depends what you mean.
We've looked at libertarian agency, we've looked at determinism, and we've looked at compatibilism, which attempts to marry the two.
Libertarianism? Certainly not.
Why I'm a Determinist
To wrap up, I'll briefly recap the three reason that I come down (provisionally) on the side of determinism.
First of all, given that our brains are made of "stuff", and our minds seem to be entirely the product of our brains, we're left without any known mechanism for free choice, from a contra-causal perspective.
Second, we have solid evidence from psychology and neurology that our decisions are not causally free, and can be strongly influenced by factors outside of our understanding or control.
And finally, we already acknowledge, both in our legal systems and in our quotidian lives, that there are reasons for our choices. Those reasons serve as explanations for our actions precisely because they have a causal influence on our decision-making.
Remember...
Either your actions are determined or they're not—but you are no more a robot if you believe in determinism than if you believe in free will.
"A theory about a thing does not change the thing the theory is about."
Harlow, J.M. 1868. "Recovery from the Passage of an Iron Bar through the Head". Publications of the Massachusetts Medical Society. 2:339–342.
Libet, B., Gleason, C.A., Wright, E.W., Pearl, D.K. 1983. "Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act". Brain. 106 (3):623–642. PMID 6640273. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/6640273
Dennett, D. 1981. "On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want". Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. MIT Press.
Moreland, J.P. 1997. "Naturalism and Libertarian Agency". Philosophy & Theology. 10, 2. http://afterall.net/papers/490937
Schopenhauer, A. 1839. "Prize Essay on Freedom of the Will".
Notes
1 A more accurate translation of Schopenhauer would be:
You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can will only one definite thing and absolutely nothing other than that one thing."
—Arthur Schopenhauer, "Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will"
2 I hesitate to mention Phineas Gage, as there exists so much exaggeration and distortion surrounding his case, with both the naturalists and the dualists of his time citing it in support of their claims. A careful review of the facts, however, supports the claim that specific damage to the brain results in specific damage to the mind and specific changes to personality.
To be clear, misinformation about the Gage case is not limited to proponents of dualism, with some (admittedly minor) misstatements of fact being presented even by the folks at Reasonable Doubts. That in mind, even a conservative reading of the known facts supports a naturalistic understanding of the mind. Although he misremembered the date of Gage's death (which I wouldn't count remarkable, save that it has been noted by several critics), Dr. John Harlow's account of the events seem balanced and fairly reliable, and supports (in my opinion) the central contention of this presentation.
Harlow writes:
The equilibrium or balance, so to speak, between his intellectual faculties and animal propensities, seems to have been destroyed. He is fitful, irreverent, indulging at times in the grossest profanity (which was not previously his custom), manifesting but little deference for his fellows, impatient of restraint or advice when it conflicts with his desires, at times pertinaciously obstinate, yet capricious and vacillating, devising many plans of future operations, which are no sooner arranged than they are abandoned in turn for others appearing more feasible. A child in his intellectual capacity and manifestations, he has the animal passions of a strong man. Previous to his injury, although untrained in the schools, he possessed a well-balanced mind, and was looked upon by those who knew him as a shrewd, smart businessman, very energetic and persistent in executing all his plans of operation. In this regard his mind was radically changed, so decidedly that his friends and acquaintances said he was "no longer Gage."
3 Proponents of some sort of quantum free will often point out that, since the advent of quantum physics, we can no longer be said to live in a clockwork universe. Perhaps it's trite of me to say so, but I think that certainly we can! When we look at clockwork, we see gears turning in a determined fashion, interlocking, all connected. We see inevitability. But, with our understanding of quantum physics in mind, we know that every clock ever commissioned was subject to the same quantum indeterminacy—and yet its gears continued to turn, day in, day out.
"If determinism is true, then the future is fixed. We couldn't change anything!"
In a sense, that's true. But don't despair: the future will still be shaped by the present, just as the present is shaped by the past. Our actions may be causally determined, but those actions still impact the thoughts and deeds of others. It's important not to confuse determinism with predeterminism or fatalism. You're no one's marionette. I'm not suggesting that your path is laid out for you: just that you will forge your own path, and that there is a path that you will forge.
"But I feel like I have free will!"
Our senses are fallible! We may seem to have free will, but we also seem to have a complete visual field, when in fact we each have a fairly sizeable blind spot in each eye. Memory seems to accurately record events, but psychological studies continue to demonstrate that it is fickle and unreliable.
"What does it matter if we don't have free will? How could this possibly be relevant?"
First off, I think that understanding that nobody is "perfectly free" to make choices might allow us to move from a justice system that is less punitive and more focused on reformation of criminals and prevention of crime, which I think that any person in their more lucid moments would agree is a step in the right direction.
Second, exploring new areas of knowledge has proved beneficial in the past, even when no immediate application of this knowledge is readily apparent. There could be medical/neurological applications, perhaps. Determinism also makes the idea of general artificial intelligence plausible, which I find to be a hopeful prospect. I don't think that it's ever a mistake to nurture intellectual curiosity.
Third, it further hamstrings that (already quite stupid) theist response to the Problem of Evil: "Humans have free will, and thus they must have the choice to do evil. Evil is caused by free will." There are many other problems with that response, of course, but pointing out the false premise can't hurt.
B.F. Skinner said it well in Beyond Freedom and Dignity: "A theory about a thing does not change the thing the theory is about." A couple of times I saw Skinner strolling through Harvard Yard. He didn't move like a robot because he espoused determinism.
—Robert M. Price, Top Secret: The Truth Behind Today’s Pop Mysticisms
I'm currently a subscriber to both Skeptic and Free Inquiry, and while perusing the August/September 2009 edition of the latter (I'm a little behind on my reading, as I cycle to and from work eight months of the year, so I don't have my hour-long public transit commute until November), I happened across an op-ed by Tibor Machan.
Lots of important people in the sciences and philosophy say that free will—the human capacity to think and do either this or do that—is a myth, a delusion. Some go so far as to recommend revamping the legal system and our ideas of ethics or morality so that concepts of guilt, innocence, responsibility, and so forth can be abandoned. No one is guilty of anything, they hold, since no one could have done anything other than what he or she did.
Okay, I'm basically on board with Machan at the beginning. I would have added emphasis to make it "the human capacity think and do either this or do that", as clearly humans have the tendency to do some things or do other things, and it's the choice of one or the other that you're after—but I'm picking nits. The real problem comes in when he says, "Some go so far as to recommend . . . that concepts of guilt, innocence, responsibility, and so forth can be abandoned. No one is guilty of anything . . . ." This strikes me as a bit of a straw man, for I'm unaware of anyone who says any such thing. It is, of course, possible that he simply misunderstands the determinist position—but if so, what's he doing writing an op-ed about it? He's presenting an argument that no one is really making to push the idea that determinists are going to release murderers and rapists from prison to kidnap your children.
There are people pushing for reform in the penal system, sure—the problem is right there in the name! Many free will sceptics are against punishment for crimes, yes; they are, however, in favour of prevention of crimes and reformation of criminals. If a bear wanders into town and mauls a child, any free will that the bear may or may not have is irrelevant. We don't punish the bear; we either lock it up someplace it can't harm anyone or we put it down. Unless you're a hopeless barbarian monster you're not in it to hurt the bear like it hurt you, you're in it to prevent someone else from being hurt. That's the whole idea.
This is just one notion that follows from the denial of free will in human life. What are some others?
Regret is out; so is pride. Apologies are pointless since no one could have acted better than she or he did. Certainly no one can be blamed for anything. Or praised. Just as it makes no sense to blame the weather for being unpleasant, even horrible, or to praise it for being great, so none of the awful stuff that people do can be blamed on them.
So?
This is one big argument from final consequences. "Well, if that's true, then . . . well life isn't as good as I thought it was!" Although it's possible (though certainly debatable) that all of these statements are correct, that doesn't matter. Maybe free will doesn't exist, and maybe it would be good if it did. The fact that free will might be nice to have and that some people want it has no causal relationship with the existence of free will. Unless you're C.S. Lewis, that is.
Imagine someone runs up to you frantically and, with a crazed look in his eye, yells: "Don't you realise that if you don't think we're immortal, we're all going to die?" What can you say to that. The fact that death is a bad thing in no way means that it is avoidable, or that sticking your fingers in your ears and loudly proclaiming that you don't believe in it will make it go away. Sure, you may think that it sucks that you don't have full control of every aspect of your inner and outer life, but that says nothing about the reality of the situation.
That means, also, that editorials . . . are equally nonsensical, gobbledygook . . . .
Well, you're certainly convincing me! But I'm just being a jerk. Here's the whole sentence:
That means, also, that editorials that congratulate some and those that chide others are equally nonsensical, gobbledygook, if there is no free will. . . . Artists must do their art, murderers must do their murders. No alternative to any of it is possible, just as the way a river runs is how it must run.
Murderers?! Oh noes! He must mean that determinists feel that art and murder are equally legitimate occupations. This is, of course, a false analogy, and an example of the is-ought fallacy: just because artists do art and murders do murder, doesn't mean that we wish it so. In fact, an artist is defined as a person who creates art, and a murderer is defined as a person who commits murder. By their very definitions, artists must do their art and murders must do their murders.
But of course, alternatives are possible. Even in a fully determined world, it is possible to stop a murder from taking place, if you define "stopping a murder" as taking an action that prevents a murder from occurring when the intention of the other party was to commit murder! It may be true that there is only one possible way that things will turn out, but no one involved knows what that is. We're not talking about fatalism, here!
Most difficult to swallow, though, is that none of what I am saying or writing here—or anything anyone else has said or written or is saying or writing or ever will say or write—is any more true or false than is the noise made by ocean ways.
And here is where the author of this particular editorial flies the idiocy flag for all to see. You're right, Tibor Machan, I do find that difficult to swallow. I happen to believe that there is one reality that we all share, and that any given proposition is either true or it is false, regardless of whether anyone ever knows it. Oh, I can guess what he's getting at, but he seems to be implying here that if we don't have free will, 2 + 2 does not equate to four. I believe that he means to say that writing down "2 + 2 = 4" is no more meaningful, in some magically objective way, than nonsense such as "FfffFWWdl;'6"; we interpret the symbols, and their meaning is what is true. But we are here, determined or not, to give the symbols meaning, to internalise them, and to analyse their truth or falsity. But even if it never occurred to anyone that water were composed of two hydrogen atoms bound to an oxygen atom, it would be true nonetheless—and if explorers one day encounter a random collection of rocks strewn across the regolith of some distant world that seems to say "water is H2O", that would be true, regardless of whether it was scribbled there by a mind governed by a will or by the mindless action of natural forces. If there is someone there to interpret it, then it has meaning.
Free or not, we're still here.
At the risk of being accused of ad hominem, I'll admit that this editorial reminded me most of a creationist screed, tying "evilution" to Nazis and Stalin. It's filled to bursting with arguments from final consequences, is-ought fallacies, and silly straw men for Machan to knock down.
Although I'm probably not an out-and-out determinist in the classical sense, I don't believe in "free" choice; there may be some quantum randomness that goes on—although most of it probably comes out in the wash, and you can't get from randomness to choice in any way that I know—but I don't believe in the "ghost in the machine" sort of free will that the religious peddle to get their god his get-out-of-the-problem-of-evil free card.
We are free to make the choices that we will make. These choices are determined by our genes, by our upbringing, by our environment, and perhaps a little by random chance—but they are determined by our nature: by what we really want. We can't change that. So we make the choices that we make because we want to make them. And if making those choices is what we want, then what are we complaining about.
Determinism, or bound will, or whatever it may come to be called when we take quantum randomness into account ("randeterminism"?—perhaps not) is a theory that accounts for whatever choice-making goes on, and from what I can see the only alternative is magic. "A theory about a thing does not change the thing the theory is about." If we don't have free will, that doesn't change who or what we are: it explains how we come to make the choices that we make. It seems to me a lovely theory that makes clear our place in the wonderful, unfolding dance of the cosmos.
Isn't it enough to see that a garden is beautiful without having to believe that there are fairies at the bottom of it too?
